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AN INTEGRATIVE, NOT NECESSARILY COMPREHENSIVE,  
BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF GAMBLING 
 
Mark R. Dixon  
Southern Illinois University 
 
Jeffrey N. Weatherly 
University of North Dakota 
___________________ 
 
     The integrative behavioral model of gam-
bling (Weatherly & Dixon, 2007) was for-
warded as an initial attempt to provide a uni-
fied and coherent behavioral account for 
gambling behavior and problems.  There were 
several reasons for making this attempt.  For 
one, no such attempt had been made to date 
despite a large literature on gambling beha-
vior existing outside behavioral psychology.  
A second reason was that such a model could 
serve as a springboard for researchers seeking 
external funding for their work, as funding 
agencies frequently prefer research proposals 
that are couched within a theoretical frame-
work.  Thirdly, proposing such a model could 
potentially spur research in support or in op-
position of the model.  Despite the excellent 
critiques and criticisms of the integrative be-
havioral model of gambling, each of our ini-
tial aims still has merit.     
The commentaries found in this issue high-
light a variety of topics that our paper raised.  
Some topical comments were critical, while  
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others were complementary.  In this response 
we will analyze each commentary individual-
ly, and conclude with a final synopsis of our 
position. 
     The commentary of Dymond and Whelan 
highlights what we believe is a critical feature 
of our model: verbal behavior.  As Dymond 
and Whelan note, a direct contingency ap-
proach will only get us so far in understand-
ing the complex human behavior of gam-
bling.  While animal models do in fact hold 
utility (see Petry, Madden, & Roll; Reilly & 
Fox), we do not believe that they can com-
pletely describe human behavior. 
     Dymond and Whelan suggest that one 
weakness in the proposed model is that we do 
not make clear our exact definition of verbal 
behavior.  Failing to do so was not an over-
sight on our part, mostly because doing so 
would be a major undertaking in and of itself.  
For sake of brevity and to minimize contro-
versy, we simply stated “verbal behavior.”  
No distinction was made between a Skinne-
rian (Skinner, 1957) or post-Skinnerian 
(Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2002) de-
finition of the term.  While we would tend to 
side with the latter definition, as recent re-
search suggests that such a definition holds 
utility to understanding choices gamblers 
make (e.g., Zlomke & Dixon, 2006), we did 
not want to limit our model to a certain set of 
pre-analytic assumptions.  Although we agree 
with Dymond and Whelan that Skinner’s de-
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finition is too broad for robust empirical re-
search, we leave the quibbling of the defini-
tion to the researchers and the findings that lie 
ahead. 
     Cooper as well as Reilly and Fox have 
noted that the jury is still out on the causal 
nature of delay discounting, and how dis-
counting rates may be predictive of patholog-
ical gambling.  We agree, and while Cooper’s 
quote of our manuscript is indeed correct, we 
would add that our intention was never to 
imply that a “cause” which determined pa-
thology was an individual’s discounting of 
future delayed rewards.  Instead, the prefe-
rence for sooner smaller consequences, are a 
factor in a larger behavioral context that the 
person interacts within.  Smaller rewards may 
be the low probability outcome of the gamble, 
avoiding paying of bills for more cash in-
hand, or robbing a neighbor to finance the 
gamble.  A behavioral repertoire consisting of 
repeated choices for sooner smaller less ad-
vantageous reinforcers that sustain gambling, 
we believe contributes to pathological gam-
bling.  Nothing in this argument is circular as 
noted by Reilly and Fox, and our use of the 
term “cause” was chosen for widespread rea-
dability rather than the perhaps more techni-
cally correct description of a participatory 
factor in an interbehavioral field of interaction 
between the organism and the environment.  
With the primary aim of our model being 
adoption outside behavior analysis, we see the 
latter, more precise description damaging to 
that primary aim. 
     Lyons raises two primary concerns with 
our model.  The first is our implied minimized 
importance of intermittent reinforcement.  
The second is our suggested dismissal of rein-
forcement history.  We believe that Lyons can 
rest assured that both are important to under-
standing the behavior of gambling from our 
perspective.  There is no doubt that we value 
both intermittent reinforcement and a history 
of reinforcement in our model.  Our point was 
never exclusion of these two variables in un-
derstanding gambling behavior, but rather 
emphasizing that they are by no means the 
exhaustive causes of the behavior.  In re-
sponse to Lyons’ question of the necessity of 
establishing operations such as age or socio-
economic status in our model, we think that 
the data will be the best determiner of their 
inclusion.  Large-group-design research has 
documented differences between factors such 
as age, socio-economic status, and race (see 
Petry, 2005 for a review).  Whether changes 
such as age and financial statue within the life 
of an individual gambler makes a difference 
in mitigating their propensity to gamble; only 
the data will tell the tale.  Lyons ends his 
commentary with the following question: 
“How do we account for individual differenc-
es in young, male, poor, single, drug-using 
minority members who do not become patho-
logical gamblers, and older, female, married, 
abstinent white women who do?”  He then 
answers his own question with: “The answer, 
I suspect, will have something to do with rein-
forcement history.”  We have no argument 
with his answer to the question, as ours would 
be the same.  The only modification we would 
have would be to emphasize the word “some-
thing”, as it is far from everything. 
     The commentary of Reilly and Fox men-
tioned that it was unclear in our paper if it 
was a description of pathological or non-
pathological gambling.  From our perspective, 
it is both.  The only distinction between the 
two from our position is a matter of degree.  
Pathological gamblers are not a separate pop-
ulation, but rather simply those who engage in 
the behavior of gambling more often than 
those who do not or are not considered patho-
logical gamblers.  Rate alone is not exclusive 
of “pathology” as the outcomes of gambling 
on the rest of the individual’s life are impor-
tant as well.  The differences between the two 
groups are often categorical, but we would 
consider them quantitative in nature. 
     The final issue we wish to respond to is 
that of our potential over-emphasis on the role 
2
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of verbal behavior and thus a downplaying of 
programmed contingencies.   Petry, Madden 
and Roll state with respect to differences be-
tween pathological and non-pathological 
gamblers that “Given these differences, the 
authors (Weatherly and Dixon) suggest that 
differential sensitivities to gambling contin-
gencies of reinforcement are not in the envi-
ronment but in human language.”  This quote 
may in fact highlight a common misconcep-
tion of human language – that language is not 
in the environment, but rather somewhere 
within the person him/herself.  A similar con-
cern was echoed by Lyons that somehow a 
choice needs to be made by theorists between 
the two variables: language and contingen-
cies).  We do not believe that such a choice is 
necessary.  Language is behavior in the envi-
ronment, and is developed, maintained, and 
extinguished via environmental contingen-
cies, just like nonverbal behavior. 
     Pointing to the consequence of verbal be-
havior is more difficult than that of nonverbal 
behavior, but nonetheless, both are behavior 
maintained by the environment.  Our embrace 
of the role of verbal behavior is not a dismis-
sal of pure programmed contingency control. 
Instead, it is an acknowledgement of the 
complexity of human behavior.  Dismissing 
verbal behavior in hopes of parsimony in ex-
plaining nonhuman behavior leads us further 
away from the goals of behavioral science – 
prediction and control.   Petry et al. may 
doubt the strength of verbal rules or instruc-
tion to control the behavior of the gambler, as 
if they could, “then treating pathological 
gambling could be greatly simplified; therap-
ists would simply instruct them to stop” (Pe-
try et al.).   We agree just telling someone to 
stop gambling will not solve the problem, as 
histories of rule following and contingency 
control are more complex and historical in 
nature than the current verbal utterance being 
emitted at that moment.  However, if a lottery 
player continues to play week after week and 
has never won the lottery, appeals to pro-
grammed reinforcement for playing (i.e., 
winning) seem substantially inadequate.  
Thus, we believe that both the environmental 
consequences for rule following (social rein-
forcement from the speaker, more effective 
contact with the environment, or momentarily 
altering the reinforcing value of the conse-
quence – see Hayes, 1987 for a full descrip-
tion of the various environmental conse-
quences of rules) and the environmental con-
sequences for non-verbal behavior are at play 
each and every time a gambler gambles. 
     We are hopeful that debates over these is-
sues will be promoted, rather than ended, by 
our comments here.  Clearly the behavioral 
perspective has much to offer in the way of 
understanding the very important issue of 
gambling behavior and pathological gam-
bling.  If our model can in any way forward 
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THE ROLE OF “EXPERIENCE” WHEN PEOPLE GAMBLE ON 
THREE DIFFERENT VIDEO-POKER GAMES 
 
Jeffrey N. Weatherly, David P. Austin, & Katie Farwell 
University of North Dakota
 
 
The present experiment was designed to determine if and how experience might 
alter individuals’ gambling when playing video poker.  Twelve self-identified 
“experienced” poker players and 12 self-identified “novices” were recruited to 
play video poker across three different sessions.  A different game (i.e., Jacks or 
Better, Bonus Poker, or Loose Deuces) was played in each session, with these 
games differing in what strategies were optimal.  “Experienced” participants 
displayed more knowledge of poker than their “novice” counterparts.  However, 
the only observed difference in the gambling between “experienced” and “no-
vice” players was in how much they bet per hand, with “experienced” players 
betting higher amounts.  Participants in both groups made frequent errors when 
playing, with error rates increasing when wild cards were introduced into the 
game.  Self-reported strategies suggested that some participants held fallacious 
views about the games and/or betting strategies, although the presence of falla-
cious views did not appear to differ between groups.  The present results indi-
cate that experience may not necessarily lead to better play and, if anything, may 
be detrimental to the player if it leads to increased betting without an increase in 
the chance of winning.  The results also suggest that, although players may alter 
their strategies when playing different poker games, they do not do so optimally. 
Keywords:  experience, video poker, gambling 
____________________ 
 
 Experience plays a major explanatory role 
within behavioral psychology.  This concept 
falls under the guise of “reinforcement histo-
ry” within a strict behavioral framework.  The 
idea that experience is a critical aspect of un-
derstanding behavior, however, has not gone 
unnoticed in other fields of psychology.  For 
instance, one can find large amounts of re-
search conducted on the influence of “know-
ledge” or “expertise” on different types 
__________ 
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of behaviors. The study of how experience 
affects behavior has actually resulted in some 
of the more widely known research results in 
psychology.  For example, de Groot (1965, 
1966) attempted to identify the influence of 
expertise by comparing the behavior of expert 
chess players (e.g., grand masters) to that of 
novices (e.g., class A chess players).  Both 
types of player were shown a chessboard on 
which pieces were arranged in a realistic 
manner such as one might find in a partially 
completed game.  Participants were asked to 
identify the best move for the next turn given 
that arrangement of pieces.  Perhaps surpri-
singly, players of both skill levels were fairly 
equivalent at identifying what the best move 
would be.  The major difference between the 
different skill levels was the number of poten-
tial moves explored by the different players.  
The masters went through fewer possible de-
rivations than the novices before concluding 
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on a move. 
 Perhaps more famous within the memory 
literature is a study by Chase and Simon 
(1973).  These researchers found that chess 
grand masters were quite adept at recreating 
configurations of chess pieces from memory 
even when given only brief exposure to the 
original configuration.  This ability, however, 
seemed to be connected to whether or not the 
pieces were configured realistically as one 
would find in an actual game of chess or had 
been arranged randomly.  In fact, when shown 
configurations of pieces randomly placed on 
the board, the grand masters were no better 
than novices at recalling their positions.  Such 
findings spurred a great deal of subsequent 
research, some of which has documented that, 
in some instances, expertise may actually be 
detrimental (e.g., Castel, McCabe, Roediger, 
& Heitman, 2007). 
 Within a cognitive framework, results from 
research on expertise have been interpreted in 
terms of cognitive processing and the organi-
zation of memory.  Within a behavioral 
framework, however, they can be interpreted 
in terms of shaping and stimulus control.  
That is, one could speculate that the results of 
de Groot (1965, 1966) occurred because, 
through extensively playing against top-notch 
competition, experts’ behavior of going 
through certain progressions of potential 
moves has been reinforced while going 
through other progressions has either been 
extinguished or punished.  Perhaps due to 
their lack of experience, novices may not dis-
criminate between productive and non-
productive progressions and thus may go 
through more of them. 
 Likewise, one could speculate that the re-
sults of Chase and Simon (1973) demonstrate 
that the configurations of chess pieces expe-
rienced by masters during actual play had 
come to serve as discriminative stimuli.  Be-
havior such as recalling the position of the 
pieces was possible when the pieces were ar-
ranged in a particular fashion.  The same be-
havior was inhibited, or at least not facilitated, 
when the pieces were differently arranged. 
 Both results have implications beyond 
chess play or the study of memory.  They 
suggest that the behavior of game players are 
altered through continued play of the game.  It 
is commonly assumed that this experience 
will enhance play.  However, that is not nec-
essarily the only possible outcome (e.g., Cas-
tel et al., 2007).  For instance, one could spe-
culate that chess players who continually play 
against lesser competition might have their 
behavior shaped in non-optimal ways.  This 
non-optimal play would not be exposed until 
playing against a more advanced opponent.  
Likewise, it is possible that stimulus control 
would develop with continued game play, but 
that is no guarantee that the stimuli that come 
to exert control over behavior are the most 
optimal in terms of maximizing performance. 
 These possibilities take on added signific-
ance when applied to gambling on games of 
chance.  Many games of chance (e.g., poker, 
blackjack, video poker) involve strategies that 
can enhance one’s chance of winning and/or 
minimize one’s chance of losing.  One might 
assume that continued play at such games 
would shape appropriate strategies.  However, 
that may not be the case.  Because of the ele-
ment of chance present in these games, proper 
decisions do not always result in winning.  
Likewise, poor or improper decisions would 
not always result in a loss.  In fact, poor deci-
sions might reduce the likelihood of winning, 
but would they would still result in the player 
winning at least intermittently.  This intermit-
tent reinforcement might in turn enhance the 
likelihood of poor decision making in the fu-
ture.  To our knowledge, research on these 
possibilities does not exist within the gam-
bling literature. 
 It is therefore not clear that experience 
would necessarily equate to improved play 
across time.  Likewise, some games of 
chance, such as poker and video poker, have 
many different variations that can be played.  
5
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These variations involve the identical or near-
ly identical stimuli (i.e., the same cards and 
winning card combinations).  However, be-
cause different games might require different 
strategies for optimal play, performance may 
be inhibited if certain stimuli (e.g., card com-
binations) come to exert stimulus control over 
players’ gambling behavior (e.g., promoting a 
certain play when dealt a specific type of 
poker hand).  In short, although intuition 
would suggest that experience should enhance 
ability, it may actually inhibit it. 
 The present experiment was designed to 
assess if and how experience might influence 
gambling when participants played a video-
poker simulation.  Individuals who self identi-
fied as “experienced” or “novice” poker play-
ers were recruited.  These individuals were 
then staked with money to play three different 
versions of video poker across three separate 
sessions.  All three games were variations of 
five-card draw, but differed in terms of what 
were the best cards to hold or discard on spe-
cific hands.  If experience promotes play, then 
experienced players should outperform novice 
players.  Furthermore, one might also predict 
that players with greater knowledge of the 
game of poker would alter their play across 
games as the odds, and thus the optimal strat-
egy, changed.  On the other hand, if expe-
rience does not necessarily shape the “optim-
al” pattern of play, then one might not expect 
experienced players to outperform novice 
players.  Likewise, if players’ behavior is un-
der the control of stimuli across the different 
games, then performance across games should 
differ because the same hands might require a 
different decision depending on which game 




 Twenty four individuals were recruited 
from the psychology department participant 
pool at the University of North Dakota.  Par-
ticipant recruitment proceeded in two phases.  
The first phase recruited people who self 
identified as “experienced” poker players (not 
limited to just video poker).  This phase was 
initiated first because it was anticipated that it 
would be more difficult to recruit “expe-
rienced” players than “novices.”  The second 
phase targeted individuals who self identified 
as “novice” poker players. 
 For both phases, recruitment information 
was posted in the psychology department 
building that targeted individuals who were 
“experienced” or “novice,” respectively, pok-
er players.  No other poker-related informa-
tion was presented beyond indicating the tar-
geted level of experience for each group.  To 
participate in either group, individuals were 
required to be at least 21 years of age and had 
to score below five on the South Oaks Gam-
bling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur & Blume, 
1987). 
  Twelve participants were recruited for 
each group (Experienced: 6 males, 6 females; 
Novice: 5 males, 7 females).  The mean age 
of participants in the Experienced group was 
28.17 years (SD = 5.70).  The mean age of 
participants in the Novice group was 28.42 
years (SD = 13.44). 
 
Materials and Apparatus 
 All participants were asked to complete a 
demographic questionnaire during their par-
ticipation.  The questionnaire asked the partic-
ipant’s sex, age, marital status, and annual 
income.  This information was collected be-
cause research on gambling (see Petry, 2005) 
indicates that each of these factors is corre-
lated to the presence of pathological gam-
bling.  The present procedure was designed to 
exclude pathological gamblers from participa-
tion.  However, it remained possible that these 
factors could potentially be associated with 
differences in the gambling behavior of the 
“experienced” and “novice” participants and 
were therefore measured. 
 Participants were also asked to answer four 
questions meant to determine their familiarity 
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with the game of poker.  The four questions 
were (with answers in parentheses): What 
cards are necessary for a full house (Three 
cards of one face value and two cards of 
another face value)?  What hands beat a full 
house (Straight flush, Four of a kind, & Royal 
flush)?  What is a set (Three cards of one face 
value)?  In a wild-card game, what is the best 
hand (a natural Royal flush)?  These questions 
were meant to determine whether the self-
identified experienced players differed in their 
knowledge of poker relative to the self-
identified novice players.  Participants’ an-
swers to these questions did not alter to which 
group they had been assigned through self 
identification. 
 The next task was the SOGS (Lesieur & 
Blume, 1987).  The SOGS is a 20-item ques-
tionnaire that focuses on the individual’s 
gambling history.  It is the most widely used 
screening measure (see Petry, 2005), with a 
score of five or more on the SOGS suggesting 
the possible presence of pathological gam-
bling.  Participants who scored five or above 
were dismissed before the gambling session 
and their demographic data were not included 
in the data analyses.  Dismissing these partic-
ipants ensured that individuals with pathology 
were not allowed to engage in their patholo-
gy. 
 Lastly, after playing each type of poker 
game, participants were asked to provide a 
written response to the following statement: 
Please describe the strategy you used when 
playing the last game.  No information on 
strategy was conveyed to the participant and 
the individual was afforded the opportunity to 
be as explicit or succinct as he or she deemed 
necessary. 
 Participants completed the above materials 
and played the video-poker game in window-
less room that measured approximately 2 m 
by 2 m.  The room contained a table and two 
chairs, with a personal computer situated on 
the table.  The video-poker software (Zamzow 
Software Solutions, 2003) on the computer 
allowed for a variety of five-card-draw poker 
games to be played.  The present experiment 
utilized three specific games.  One (Jacks) 
was “Jacks or Better,” which returned the 
player’s bet for a pair of Jacks or higher.  A 
Flush was paid at 6-1 odds, a Full house was 
paid at 9-1 odds, and a Four of a kind at 25-1 
odds.  The second game (Bonus) was “Bonus 
Poker,” which was similar to “Jacks or Bet-
ter” with the exception that it returned 5-1 for 
a Flush and 8-1 for a Full house.  It also paid 
three different amounts for Four of a kind, 
with 25-1 odds for Fives through Kings, 40-1 
odds for Twos, Threes, and Fours, and 80-1 
odds for Aces.  The third game (Deuces) was 
“Loose Deuces,” which was five-card draw 
with Twos wild.  This game required at least 
Three of a kind to return the player’s bet and 
included payouts for Five of a kind (15-1 
odds), a Royal flush with Twos (25-1 odds), 
and Four twos (500-1 odds). 
 These specific games were chosen for two 
reasons.  The first was that they sometimes 
differed in what was the “best play” when 
dealt the same hand of cards.  For instance, if 
the player was dealt the 7 of diamonds, 8 of 
diamonds, Jack of diamonds, 9 of hearts, and 
the King of hearts, the best play would be to 
hold the 7, 8, and Jack if one is playing Jacks 
or Deuces.  However, the best return on Bo-
nus would come by holding the Jack and 
King.  If the player was dealt the 10 of clubs, 
Jack of diamonds, Queen of diamonds, Ace of 
diamonds, and Ace of hearts, then the best 
play would be to hold the two Aces if one was 
playing Jacks or Bonus.  However, the best 
return on Deuces would come if one held the 
Jack, Queen, and Ace of diamonds.  In terms 
of similarity, the best play was most often the 
same between Jacks and Bonus.  To play 
Deuces optimally, one would need to take an 
alternate strategy than with the other two 
games fairly frequently.  The second reason 
was that these three games are commonly 
found in major commercial casinos in the 
United States.  Thus, if one was an expe-
7
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rienced video poker play, it is reasonable to 
speculate that one might have played each 
type of game. 
 The software recorded the number of times 
during each session that the player deviated 
from the optimal play.  The optimal play was 
the one which maximized the player’s rate of 
return given that particular hand.  Non-
optimal plays were recorded as errors.  The 
software allowed for errors to be categorized 
from minor to major, depending on the devia-
tion in rate of return from the optimal play.  
For purposes of the present study, however, 
plays were categorized as accurate (i.e., op-
timal play) or inaccurate (i.e., any play that 
was not optimal).  Players were not notified as 
to what the best play was for a given hand or 
as to whether they had made the optimal 
choice.  The only information provided to 
participants was the pay table that appeared 




 Participants were run individually.  Upon 
arrival, the researcher initiated the informed-
consent process.  Once the participant had 
provided consent, he or she was asked to 
complete the SOGS.  Next, the participant 
was asked to complete the remaining forms 
while the researcher scored the SOGS.  If the 
participant scored five or more on the SOGS, 
then the session ended after the forms were 
completed.  In this event, which occurred 
once for a female participant recruited for the 
Experienced group, the participant was de-
briefed, given course extra credit (if applica-
ble), and dismissed. 
 The researcher then situated the participant 
in front of the computer and read the follow-
ing instructions: 
 
You will now be given the opportunity to play a 
computer generated, five-card-draw poker 
game.  You will be staked with 100 credits.  
Each credit is worth 5 cents.  Thus, you are be-
ing staked with $5.  You may bet up to five cre-
dits per play and your goal should be to end the 
session with as many credits as you can.  You 
may quit (i.e., end the session) at any time by 
informing the researcher that you wish to end 
the session.   The session will end when a) you 
quit playing, b) you reach 0 credits, or 15 mi-
nutes have elapsed.  You will be paid in cash at 
the end of today’s session for the number of 
credits you have accumulated or have remain-
ing.  Do you have any questions? 
 
 Questions were answered by repeating the 
above instructions.  The participant then 
played the video-poker game until one of the 
three criteria to end that session was met.  The 
researcher then asked the participant to com-
plete the form pertaining to the strategy the 
player had just used.  During that time, the 
researcher readied the next type of game.  The 
researcher then read the identical instructions.  
This process was repeated until the participant 
had played all three poker games and had 
completed the strategy forms after each.  
Upon completion, the participant was de-
briefed, paid, provided course extra credit (if 
applicable), and dismissed.  The order that 
participants experienced the three different 




 Data from participants in each group were 
compared on the measures of age, marital sta-
tus, annual income, SOGS score, and the 
number of poker-knowledge questions cor-
rectly answered.  The only significant differ-
ence between the groups was observed with 
the poker knowledge questions (F(1, 22) = 
8.17, p=.001, 
2
=.374), with the participants 
in the experienced group answering signifi-
cantly more questions correctly than partici-
pants in the novice group
1
.  Results from 
these analyses, and all that follow, were con-
sidered significant at p<.05. 
 Figure 1 presents the results from the vid-
eo-poker sessions.  The graphs in Figure 1 did 
not take into account how sessions ended.  
8
Analysis of Gambling Behavior, Vol. 1 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://repository.stcloudstate.edu/agb/vol1/iss1/8
39 EXPERIENCE ON VIDEO POKER  
That is, results were calculated across the en-
tire session regardless of whether the session 
ended before or after 15 min.  Sessions lasting 
less than 15 min occurred on at least 10 occa-
sions because either participants had lost all 
100 credits or because they chose to terminate 
the session.  The majority of sessions, howev-
er, were 15 min in length. 
 The data in Figure 1 were analyzed by 
conducting a two-way (Experience by Game) 
multivariate mixed-model analysis of va-
riance.  In this analysis, poker experience 
served as the grouping factor and type of 
game served as the repeated measure.  The 
four measures presented in Figure 1 were the 
dependent variables.  In the omnibus analysis, 
both the main effect of experience (Pillai’s 
Trace = .453, F(4, 19) = 3.93, p=.017, 

2
=.453) and game were significant (Pillai’s 
Trace = .640, F(8, 15) = 3.33, p=.021, 

2
=.640).  These results suggest that the expe-
rienced group played differently than the no-
vice group and that both groups played diffe-
rently across the three different games, re-
spectively.  The interaction between expe-
rience and game was not significant. 
 Follow-up univariate tests indicated that 
the main effect of experience was limited to 
the average bet size per hand (see second 
graph from bottom in Figure 1).  Specifically, 
participants in the experienced group wagered 
more credits per hand than did participants in 
the novice group (F(1, 22) = 12.92, p=.002, 

2
=.370).  Of the other measures, only the to-
tal number of credits bet across the session 




 Follow-up univariate tests indicated that 
the main effect of game was limited to the 
__________ 
1
It should be noted that additional statistical analyses 
were conducted that coded data based on how well 
participants answered the questions on poker know-
ledge instead of by self-identified group.  These ana-
lyses also failed to produce significant effects of 
“knowledge” beyond finding differences in average bet 
size per hand. 
accuracy of play (see bottom graph in Figure 
1; F(2, 44) = 8.87, p=.001, 
2
=.287).  Fur-
thermore, the linear polynomial contrast was 
significant for this measure (F(1, 22) = 23.14, 
p<.001, 
2
=.513), indicating that accuracy de-
creased across the Jacks, Bonus, and Deuces 
sessions, in that order. 
 Responses on the strategy questionnaires 
completed after each poker session were ana-
lyzed, but few participants provided much, if 
any, detailed information.  Completed ques-
tionnaires were screened for accurate and in-
accurate statements.  Fallacious comments 
were sometimes observed and fell into two 
general categories, faulty betting strategies 
(e.g. “One time I bet 5 and lost, so I stopped 
doing that” or “When I noticed my luck was 
high, I would switch to betting 2 credits in-
stead of one”) and a lack of understanding of 
the game (e.g., “I also started trying for bigger 
hands because they give a higher payout” or 
“I tried going for more advanced things like 
flushes, straights and full houses”).  These 
latter comments are fallacious because what 
hands one attempts to obtain should be dic-
tated by the cards one is dealt, not by the 
payoff table alone.  Statistical analyses were 
conducted on the frequency counts of the 
number of participants in each group who re-
ported fallacious strategies and the total num-
ber of fallacious comments per participant 
regarding their play in each session.  No sig-
nificant differences were found. 
 Most, but not all, participants in both 
groups expressed that they altered their strat-
egy across the different games (e.g., “I didn’t 
keep as many face cards because two of a 
kind didn’t do anything”).  Again, however, 
there were no statistically significant differ-
ences between the groups in that respect. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 The present experiment was designed to 
investigate whether experienced poker players 
would play better (or differently) when 
9
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Figure 1.  Presented are the means for each group on four different measures of behavior 
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playing video poker relative to inexperienced 
players.  It was also designed to assess wheth-
er players would alter their playing strategies 
across games that required different strategies 
to play them perfectly.  In some ways, the re-
sults were both intriguing and alarming.  Ex-
perienced players did not play better than no-
vice players.  In fact, they only differed from 
novices in that they made larger bets than did 
the novices.  Although the qualitative data 
suggest that players attempted to change 
strategies across the different games, these 
attempts did not optimize their chances of 
winning.  Both experienced and novice poker 
players responded well below 100% accuracy, 
with the worst accuracy rates being observed 
when wild cards were introduced into the 
game. 
 One obvious criticism of the present study 
was that, although it recruited “experienced” 
poker players, the participants may not have 
been “expert” players.  The fact that the expe-
rienced participants played no better than the 
novice participants clearly supports this criti-
cism, as does the fact that the accuracy rate of 
the experienced players averaged less than 
70% across the three games.  In the present 
study, participants who self identified as “ex-
perienced” or “novice” poker players were 
placed in those respective groups without 
question before their poker knowledge was 
assessed.  Thus, it is legitimate to believe that 
different results would have been observed if 
professional poker players (i.e., experts) had 
been recruited rather than self-identified expe-
rienced players.  Indeed, past research that 
reported differences between experienced and 
inexperienced participants either used forma-
lized criteria to delineate the different groups 
before (e.g., de Groot, 1965, 1966) or after 
(e.g., Castel et al., 2007) performance data 
were collected .  The present study did neither 
and it is therefore possible that there was a 
sizeable overlap in skill between the groups.
1
 
 These criticisms notwithstanding, the 
present results still have value.  Participants in 
the “experienced” group self identified as ex-
perienced poker players and it seems reasona-
ble to assume that they therefore believed that 
their “experience” made them different from 
novice players.  Furthermore, the knowledge 
base of the experienced players did differ sig-
nificantly from that of the novice players as 
measured by the four-item questionnaire ad-
ministered during the session.  Thus, although 
the present “experienced” participants may 
not have been poker experts, they did present 
themselves as experienced poker players and 
displayed an enhanced knowledge of the 
game relative to the novice players. 
 Unfortunately, these differences did not 
translate into superior play.  Rather, expe-
rience only functioned to increase how much 
participants wagered per hand.  There are 
several possible explanations for why this 
outcome was observed.  One might be tied to 
knowledge level.  It is the case that one’s 
chances of winning on each of the three 
games are maximized if one bets the maxi-
mum number of credits possible (i.e., 5) ver-
sus any other amount (see below for an ex-
planation).  It is possible that “experienced” 
players recognized this fact.  However, this 
explanation can be questioned.  Although ex-
perienced players had a significantly higher 
average bet size than the novice players, the 
experienced players still averaged well below 
the maximum bet size (which is needed to 
maximize the chances of winning).  Further-
more, the self reports of strategies used did 
not provide a single instance in which a play-
er identified that it was in his or her best in-
terest to bet the maximum number of credits. 
 A second possibility is that participants’ 
experience served to enhance their confidence 
in winning and therefore they wagered more 
money per hand than did novice participants.  
In behavioral terms, experience may have 
served as a setting event (Kantor & Smith, 
1975).  Setting events are conditions that alter 
the reinforcing consequences of a behavior on 
a relatively permanent basis.  It is possible 
11
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that experience did so by altering the conse-
quences associated with betting. 
 A third, but not last, possibility is that ex-
perienced participants have habituated 
(Thompson & Spencer, 1966) to betting small 
amounts.  This process would lead expe-
rienced players to bet larger and larger 
amounts to achieve the same level of stimula-
tion as before.  The present study did not as-
certain why participants bet the number of 
tokens per hand that they did, so each of these 
possibilities remain open. 
 The failure to find a difference between 
experienced and novice players in accuracy of 
play is partially consistent with the results of 
de Groot (1965, 1966), who found that expert 
and non-expert chess players would often 
come to the same decision on which play to 
make.  However, de Groot reported that ex-
perts did so more quickly (or at least explored 
fewer alternatives) than non-experts.  This 
latter finding was absent in the present data.  
If the experienced players made decisions 
more quickly than the novice players, then 
one would predict that they would have been 
able to play more hands per session than the 
novices.  That was not the case.  The differ-
ence in the number of hands played was not 
significant and, if anything, the experienced 
players averaged fewer hands per session than 
the novice players.  De Groot also reported 
that both experts and novices ultimately came 
to a good decision.  That was often not the 
case in the present experiment, as both expe-
rienced and novice players made frequent 
mistakes. 
 Failing to show that experience had a posi-
tive impact on video-poker play has some 
negative implications.  If experience does not 
enhance play, but rather makes people more 
likely to wager more money, then gaining ex-
perience may not be in the gambler’s best in-
terest.  Risking larger and larger sums of 
money without a concomitant increase in the 
probability of winning may in fact promote 
pathology.  Future research should attempt to 
assess the reliability of the present findings in 
this regard.  That research should also attempt 
to explore the mechanism that potentially 
leads to increases in bet size with experience. 
 The second question asked by the present 
study was whether players’ behavior would 
be differentially controlled by the different 
games or whether players would play similar-
ly across the different games.  Qualitative 
responses suggest that players noted the dif-
ferent contingencies of the different games 
and altered their strategies.  However, the 
quantitative data suggest that players either 
did not alter their strategies (and thus their 
accuracy varied across the games) or altered 
them inappropriately.  That is, accuracy rates 
were quite low, again averaging less than 
70% for all three games. 
 One could potentially argue that this par-
ticular outcome was influenced by the fact 
that, although participants were gambling 
with actual money, it was not their own mon-
ey and therefore they did not take the time or 
effort to play well.  This criticism cannot be 
completely refuted.  However, there is at least 
one argument against it.  Specifically, pre-
vious research on the “endowment effect” has 
demonstrated that when people are gifted 
something, they take ownership of it and are 
negatively impacted by its loss (e.g., Kahne-
man, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990).  None of the 
present participants expressed surprise when 
paid cash at the end of the experiment.  That 
outcome suggests participants were aware that 
they were playing with real money, which 
should have promoted the endowment effect.  
However, to fully answer this criticism, one 
would need to conduct the experiment with 
participants risking their own money.  For 
ethical reasons, such a replication is unlikely.  
Given ethical constraints, the present proce-
dure appears to be as close to actual gambling 
as possible in the laboratory. 
 The fact that participants performed so 
poorly when playing is troublesome, especial-
ly given that video poker is touted (accurately 
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so) as one of the most gambler-friendly games 
in a casino (e.g., see VideoPokerAdvi-
sor.com).  That was indeed the case in the 
present study.  If participants had played per-
fectly and bet five credits per play (which 
raises one’s overall chances because the Roy-
al flush pays above the standard multiplier 
when one places the maximum bet), their rate 
of return would have been 99.54, 99.17, and 
100.97% for the Jacks-or-Better, Bonus Pok-
er, and Loose Deuces games, respectively.  
Played perfectly for an indefinite period, 
Loose Deuces is not gambling, it is investing.  
However, participants played far from per-
fectly and actually played the most inaccu-
rately when playing Loose Deuces. 
 Generalizing laboratory results to naturally 
occurring situations should always be done 
with caution.  However, if allowed to general-
ize the present results to a casino setting, then 
one would surmise that it would be in the ca-
sino’s best interest to provide patrons with 
experience playing its games even if it comes 
at an initial cost to the casino (e.g., staking 
players with house money, sponsoring low-
cost or free “tournaments”).  Doing so would 
promote increased wagers in the future that 
come with “experience.”  It would also be in 
the best interest of the casino to introduce var-
iations of games players are already familiar 
with but that require different strategies for 
accurate play.  Even though players might 
alter their strategies when playing these new 
games, they are unlikely to do so optimally.  
For readers familiar with casinos, these gene-
ralizations are not likely to seem far fetched.  
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